Whither the Nation State?

I'm beginning what no doubt will be a long but fruitful slog through The Shield of Achilles; War, Peace and the Course of History., by Phillip Bobbit. One of Bobbit's key theses is, the Nation-State -- which he defines as the democratic, capitalist, parliamentary states that arose after Napoleonic and U.S. Civil Wars -- are failing in to deliver those things on which their core grasp on legitimacy hinges, that the state will better the welfare of the nation. Around the corner, and arising to take the place of the Nation State, is the Market State which will secure legitimacy by ensuring maximization of opportunity for its citizens.

But all that comes later. First I must wade through 700 pages or so of Bobbit's detailed and fascinating history of nations, states and their phases from about the Hundred Years' War to the present.

A perspective that he brings forth is that essentially the entire 20th Century from August, 1914 to December, 1990 consisted of one-long war, which he calls...

The Long War.

The Long War consisted of the struggle between three ideologies; liberal parliamentarianism, fascism, and communism. Although the victory of liberal parliamentarianism is generally to be lauded as a step forward for civilization, these states have failed to change along with the vast changes in the geopolitical landscape post-Long War. The weakness of the victor nation states in the present, Bobbit describes:

The reason the traditional strategic calculus no longer functions is that it depends on certain assumptions about the relationship between the State and its objectives that the end of this long conflict has cast in doubt. That calculus was never intended to enable a state to choose between competing objectives; rather, that calculus depends upon the axiomatic requirement of the Sate to survive by putting its security objectives first. We are now entering a period, however, in which the survival of the State is paradoxically imperiled by such threat-based assumptions because the most powerful states don not face identifiable state-centered threats that in fact imperil their security. Having vanquished its ideological competitors the democratic, capitalist, parliamentary state no longer faces great-power threats, threats that would enable it to configure its forces by providing a template inferred from the capabilities of the adversary state. Instead, the parliamentary state manifests vulnerabilities that arise from a weakening of its own legitimacy. This constitutional doubt is only exacerbated by the strategic confusion abroad for which it is chiefly responsible. So the alliance of parliamentary great powers, having won their historic triumph, find themselves weaker than ever, constantly undermining their own authority at home by their inability to use their influence effectively abroad.

This weakening of authority and legitimacy is can be seen externally in the sorts of 4th Generation War effects being used by anti-coalition forces in Iraq, as well as the big-picture issues that the great-powers seem unable to contain, from Iran to a rising and newly feisty proto-oligarchy (or Market-State?) in Russia.

The consensus of the reviews of the book is that Bobbit is somewhat less than clear on what a Market State might look like -- understandable as one does not yet exist -- and this provides an unsatisfactory payoff for the long slog through... well like the title says, the Course of History.

More anon.