Gen. Petraeus' Dirty Job

I have no doubt at all that Gen. Petraeus is one of the most capable field commanders the US Armed forces have produced in a generation. His command of the 101st Airborne in the early years of the war (how sad that we are referring to the "early years") showed that he "got it," about the new kind of war fighting that would be required to give us any chance of success in Iraq.

His reward was to be given a promotion and tasked with the thankless work of attempting to turn the sow's ear of the Bush administration's strategy in Iraq into a silk purse of a stable unified state.

We should have no doubts that Gen. Petraeus' report will reflect the political will of the administration. No matter what his personal judgement he will in the end, be a good soldier and take orders. It is a dirty job, but a soldier's duty is full of distasteful tasks.

Last week, Hilzoy of the Obsidian Wings blog wrote a guest post over at Andrew Sullivan's blog while Sullivan was on honeymoon. There really isn't much to add to it. It logically picks apart everything that will be said in defense of the surge and continuing engagement in Iraq under the current strategy.

Read all of: Thirteen Ways Not to Think About the Petraeus Report:

(1) "The surge is working; we should maintain it until we've done the job." -- This is not an option. Fred Kaplan:

"Adm. Michael Mullen, the incoming chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified at his confirmation hearings last month that the "surge" in Iraq could not be sustained at present levels past April 2008.

There are a few ways to remedy this shortfall, all of them impractical or infeasible. First, soldiers' tours of duty in Iraq, which were recently extended from 12 months to 15 months, could be stretched further to 18 months. However, Gen. Richard Cody, the Army's vice chief of staff, told me, during a recent interview for a separate story, that this idea is "off the table." As it should be: The relentless rotation cycles have already compelled many soldiers and junior officers to quit the Army; pushing duty and tolerance much further might not just exhaust the troops beyond limits but spark an exodus from the armed forces."

This means that the surge will end next April. When we ask ourselves whether or not to maintain it until then, we should recognize that the only question worth asking is: will keeping the extra troops there until April improve matters? Asking whether it would improve matters to keep them there in perpetuity, or "until we get the job done", is beside the point: we can't.

(6) But look at all our military progress! Doesn't that count for anything? -- In a word, no; at least not without political reconciliation. What is true in Anbar is true across the board: if the Iraqi government uses the increased security our troops are providing for them to create the conditions for real peace, then we will have accomplished something of real importance. If, on the other hand, they do not, then once our troop levels go back to normal, or lower, we'll be right back where we started. The entire effect of the surge will have been to produce a temporary fix, not a lasting improvement.

Don't take my word for it, though: here's Bush's nominee to be head of the Joint Chiefs:

"Unless the Iraqi government takes advantage of the "breathing space" that U.S. forces are providing, Mullen said, "no amount of troops in no amount of time will make much of a difference." (...)

In written responses to committee questions, Mullen warned that "there is no purely military solution in Iraq" and that the country's politicians "need to view politics and democracy as more than just majority rule, winner-take-all, or a zero-sum game." Absent that, he said, the United States will be forced to reevaluate its strategy."

Everything turns on whether or not the Maliki government takes advantage of the surge to make real progress towards reconciliation. And, of course, they haven't. From a briefing accompanying the National Intelligence Estimate:

"Political reconciliation has come to a "standstill," said a senior intelligence official who briefed reporters on the condition of anonymity."

And from a story on the recent GAO report:

"One of eight political benchmarks -- the protection of the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature -- has been achieved, according to the draft. On the others, including legislation on constitutional reform, new oil laws and de-Baathification, it assesses failure.

"Prospects for additional progress in enacting legislative benchmarks have been complicated by the withdrawal of 15 of 37 members of the Iraqi cabinet," it says. An internal administration assessment this month, the GAO says, concluded that "this boycott ends any claim by the Shi'ite-dominated coalition to be a government of national unity." An administration official involved in Iraq policy said that he did not know what specific interagency document the GAO was citing but noted that it is an accurate reflection of the views of many officials."

And, of course, there is no real Sunni buy-in to the government, which makes reconciliation even more unlikely.

And without reconciliation, any improvements in security will vanish as soon as we do.

The sad truth of the matter is that it took a brutal strongman like Saddam Hussein to hold the diverse population of the state of Iraq together. The only realistic option for a post-invasion success was to maintain the Baathist civil service and Army in place and to put an overwhelming US presence on the ground -- an MP on every corner. This is the model that worked in post-WWII Germany. It was proven and as close to a sure thing as there is in international politics.

The Bush Administration had other plans. Plans that they have stuck with for four years despite overwhelming evidence that not only were they not working, they were almost surely never going to work. Even the best generals leading the best army in the world wanting it with all their hearts and blood can make it work.

The inevitable decay of Iraq will come for Bush's successor(s). The responsibility for dealing with it will be theirs and ours in the years to come. But at the end of the day, all can and should know that the responsibility for these results rest squarely at the feet of Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld. The blood is on their hands.

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